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1. Introduction
Procurement of commodities plays a pivotal role in the
success of global firms but brings with it the challenges
of dealing with different sources of risk, such as supply
unavailability, demand uncertainty, and price volatil-
ity. To manage these commodity risks, firms will use
a portfolio of procurement arrangements. Buying from
a spot market offers flexibility but is characterized by
great price uncertainty (Seifert et al. 2004). An alterna-
tive is to use supply options to hedge against future
price rises and low demand (Martínez-de-Albéniz and
Simchi-Levi 2005, Kleindorfer 2008). Supply option
contracts allow firms to adjust their procurement costs
based on realized demand and spot price, but an
upfront fee has to be paid to suppliers. By signing
option contracts, the buyer’s demand risk is mitigated
by freely choosing the executed capacity after she
knows the actual demand, and the supplier’s finan-
cial risk is also diminished by receiving the reservation
payment from the buyer in the early period. The under-
lying assumption is that the supplier only prepares the
amount of capacity that is reserved, so this becomes
the limit for later production.
The combination of spot purchases and supply
options has seen widespread applications in capital-
intensive industries, such as commodity chemicals,
electric power, and semiconductors (Kleindorfer and
Wu 2003, Wu and Kleindorfer 2005). The challenge of
such hybrid commodity procurement is exacerbated if
there are further restrictions that require buying firms
to reserve capacity in blocks. This occurs when there are
standard sizes for a production facility that needs to be
built or made available in its entirety. An example of
this sort occurs within the UK’s system for purchasing
Short Term Operating Reserve (STOR) for electricity
supply (National Grid 2017). This is a scheme under
which the National Grid maintains a reserve genera-
tion ability in case of sudden demand variations or
plant failures. Part of the operating reserve is made up
by contracts that are bid for within the STOR scheme.
In this market, the bids come as blocks of capacity, so
the National Grid determines the right set of blocks
to reserve. Tenders are assessed on the basis of reser-
vation prices (known as availability prices) and execu-
tion prices (known as utilization prices) together with a
consideration of response times and geographical loca-
tion. Figure 1 shows STOR bidding data from round 18
(2012: season 6.5) with accepted bids shown as circles
(in green). This illustrates the portfolio selection and
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Figure 1. (Color online) The STOR Bids Submitted in
Round 18, Season 6.5
0
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
0 100.00 200.00 300.00
Av
ai
la
bi
lity
 p
ric
e 
(po
un
ds
 pe
r M
W
 hr
)
Utilization price (pounds per MW hr)
Rejected
Accepted
one can see that there is a curved boundary for the bids
accepted.
The National Grid is not alone when it comes
to capacity reservation in blocks. For example, Elia,
Belgium’s transmission system operator and a key
player in the energy market, also purchases power
reserve (in the forms of Strategic Reserve and Ancil-
lary Services) to maintain the balance on the electricity
system. Power plants are made available to be called
on by Elia in case of demand surges or supply shortage
at existing generation units. In the procurement auc-
tion, bidders are evaluated based on reservation price
(¤/MW/h) and variable activation price (¤/MW/h)
as well as other criteria such as compliance and relia-
bility performances (Elia 2015).
Motivated by the STOR and Strategic Reserve exam-
ples, this paper studies an auction model where a
single buyer, facing an uncertain future demand and
volatile spot market, would like to determine an opti-
mal portfolio of procurement strategies. The demand
will be met using a combination of a spot market
and supply options from multiple competing suppli-
ers. In this model, each supplier dedicates a capac-
ity block that is bid into the option market. The sup-
plier bids consist of a reservation price and an execu-
tion price; given these bids, the buyer decides which
blocks to reserve prior to knowing actual demand and
spot price. When demand and spot price uncertainties
are resolved, the buyer decides how much reserved
capacity to use and how much to purchase from the
spot market.
In this context, it is natural for the buyer to purchase
from a portfolio of suppliers in the option market. If
there is no uncertainty in demand, then the buyer will
select the supplier with the lowest total of reservation
and execution price. But if there is just a small chance
of demand occurring, then it makes sense to use a sup-
plier with a very low reservation price, even if the sum
of reservation and execution prices is higher. When
demand has a known distribution, then it will be best
to reserve some supply from suppliers with low total
cost (whowill be used tomeet demand that is relatively
certain) and some further supply from low reservation
cost suppliers (in order to meet higher demand on the
few occasions that it occurs).
The same ideas arise when considering the mix of
generation capacity in a wholesale electricity market.
The base-load generation has the lowest overall cost,
while other types of “peaking” generation have lower
cost for a fixed amount of installed capacity but higher
costs for generation. Peaking generation is an appro-
priate part of the portfolio mix for use when demand
is high. Some form of capacity reservation mechanism
operates in many electricity wholesale markets (UK
Statutory Instruments 2014). These capacity auctions
operate in parallel with a spot market; see Joskow
(2008) for more information on capacity auctions.
Our model is distinguished by explicit consideration
of nonscalable capacity, which must be purchased in
blocks. The buyer’s problem we consider involves a
choice between “blocks” of capacity that are offered,
where the buyer does not have the option of reserv-
ing only part of a block (this matches the STOR and
Strategic Reserve examples above). Thus, the problem
for the buyer is simply to select the right set of suppli-
ers. We will assume that if capacity is not purchased in
advance, it can also be purchased from a spot market.
The spot market price is drawn from a known distribu-
tion, but its realization is unknown at the point when
capacity is purchased. We are interested in the suppli-
ers’ optimal policies, where suppliers know their costs
(both for reservation and execution) and want to deter-
mine their prices in a competitive market.
The main contributions of this paper are summa-
rized as follows. First, we examine in depth a combina-
torial auction problem in which competing suppliers
each own a capacity block and are evaluated based on
their two-dimensional prices by the buyer, who makes
a binary choice on each block. To our knowledge, this
paper is among the first to study this discrete form of
capacity auction, and we establish results that serve as
an important complement to the existing studies (see
detailed discussions in Section 2). The buyer’s problem
is of interest in its own right, and our second contri-
bution is to establish submodularity for the expected
profit of the buyer as a function of block selection, a
result we use in order to establish supply chain effi-
ciency in equilibrium. Although maximizing a gen-
eral submodular function is computationally hard, we
show that the buyer’s optimization problem can be
solved very efficiently. Third, our results generate use-
ful insights for both the bidders and the auctioneer. For
example, setting the execution price at cost and mak-
ing money only from the buyer’s reservation payments
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is an optimal strategy for any bidder. This makes the
decision making process much easier when bidding
for the buyer’s capacity procurement business. More-
over, we show that the full system efficiency can be
achieved in equilibrium for this noncooperative game,
which provides a theoretical support for these types of
arrangements. We note that some of our results mirror
those found in some similar studies, but the underly-
ing driving forces are different as will be clear in later
sections.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
After a literature review in the next section, we set up
our model in Section 3 and describe the exact sequence
of decisions that need to be made. In Section 4 we dis-
cuss the buyer’s problem of choosing an optimal set
of suppliers and show that one can efficiently identify
an optimal solution when all the suppliers offer blocks
of the same size. In Section 5 we turn to the problem
faced by the suppliers. We show that (a) regardless of
how the other suppliers bid, it is best for any supplier
to bid his execution price at cost, making profits only
on the reservation component in his bid, and (b) pro-
vided all the blocks are of an equal size, at any Nash
equilibrium the buyer selects exactly those suppliers
necessary to give an efficient outcome for the supply
chain as a whole. We also characterize a class of equi-
libria for the case where suppliers’ blocks are of dif-
ferent sizes. In Section 6, we discuss three extensions
to show the limits of the results obtained for the base-
line model. Finally, we make some concluding remarks
in Section 7. All technical proofs are presented in the
online appendix.
2. Literature Review
Several streams of literature are related to our problem.
An auction in a multidimensional setting where play-
ers have private information about their own costs, is
often treated as a type of mechanism design problem,
where we ask what mechanism can be used by the auc-
tioneer to ensure truthful revelation of costs and hence
an efficient and effective choice between bidders. Chao
and Wilson (2002) address some fundamental ques-
tions of an auction for power reserves in which the
requirement is to specify both a scoring rule to deter-
mine which capacity is to be used and a payment rule
for the winning suppliers. Schummer and Vohra (2003)
develop an Expected Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (EVCG)
mechanism that arranges the payments to give each
supplier his contribution to the expected overall cost.
There is a continuum of EVCG mechanisms with dif-
ferent amounts paid to the suppliers up front and after
demand is realized, but they all have the characteristic
of inducing truthful revelation of the actual costs (both
for reservation and execution). Our approach is differ-
ent from those of this literature: not only do we have
a combinatorial style auction with blocks of capacity
reserved from selected suppliers, but we also have sup-
pliers who are paid exactly as they bid and a buyer
who simply maximizes her own profit.
The transport area provides a number of applica-
tions for models in which capacity is purchased in
advance. A freight forwarder usually books capacity
(in the form of slots) from carriers for a particular
route before knowing the future demand. Kasilingam
(1996) and Hellermann (2006) give useful surveys of
the market structure of the air cargo industry and the
related literature. Several papers formulate a stylized
game theoretic model between a carrier and a for-
warder. Hellermann (2006) studies a capacity contract
with a reservation price and an execution price like
ours. Amaruchkul et al. (2011) extend the above mod-
els by examining how much information rent has to be
paid to a forwarderwho possesses private information.
Problems of procurement and contract design for
supply options have been considered bymany authors;
see, e.g., Barnes-Schuster et al. (2002) and Burnetas
and Ritchken (2005). Detailed literature reviews can
be found in Wu and Kleindorfer (2005) and Martínez-
de-Albéniz and Simchi-Levi (2005). Recently, several
papers have incorporated spot market and capacity
limits into supply option models. Fu et al. (2010) con-
sider a procurement problem where the spot price
available to the buyer is random andmay be correlated
with the uncertain demand. Lee et al. (2013) analyze a
model with a spot market and a capacity limit on each
supplier. A similar model is also analyzed by Perakis
and Zaretsky (2008), who consider a multiperiod ver-
sion of the problem. These models are concerned with
the buyer’s purchasing decision instead of the bidding
game between suppliers.
A closely related paper by Wu et al. (2002) considers
a model with a spot market. In the model the buyer
signs a contract in advance with a single supplier at
a fixed reservation and execution price, but the deci-
sion on how much to purchase is delayed until the
price in the spot market is known. Demand is deter-
mined by the buyer’s utility and hence depends on
the price paid. In this model the randomness occurs
in the spot price, rather than directly in demand. With
just a single supplier operating alongside a spot mar-
ket, they show that it is best for the supplier to offer
a contract with execution price equal to its cost. Wu
and Kleindorfer (2005) extend this result to the case of
multiple competing suppliers where again a spot mar-
ket provides an alternative source of supply/demand
for the buyer/suppliers. They show that a competitive
equilibrium between the suppliers will deliver an effi-
cient solution for the supply chain as a whole. Our
model is different from this literature since we have
uncertainty in demand as well as in the spot price
and we also have a restriction that capacity is only
available in discrete blocks—the buyer must reserve
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it all or none. We show that the results of Wu and
Kleindorfer (2005) extend to this case with suppli-
ers offering contracts with an execution price equal to
cost and an equilibrium that is efficient for the whole
supply chain. However, “the ultimate driver of [their]
efficiency results is competition in the presence of a
backup open spot market” (p. 460), while we identify a
different driving force for the efficiency result, namely,
the all-or-none nature of the buyer’s decision. Further-
more, the equilibrium reservation prices and profit
allocation are different, and also the existence of equi-
librium is not guaranteed in their model (see Theo-
rem 2 therein), whereas it is guaranteed in our model.
The model considered by Martínez-de-Albéniz and
Simchi-Levi (2009) is also close to ours, with competing
suppliers offering reservation and execution prices to a
buyer who has to meet uncertain demand. Their model
does not include a spot market, but a more significant
difference is that they assume that each supplier has an
(infinitely) scalable capacity, and the buyer can decide
how much capacity to reserve from each supplier. The
authors show that the suppliers will set reservation
and execution prices that cluster together into groups
of two or three suppliers. They also consider howmuch
allocation inefficiency can incur because of supplier
competition and show that if the demand distribution
is log-concave, the inefficiency is never more than 25%.
In our model, however, we assume that capacity comes
as a block so that the buyer is faced with a combi-
natorial optimization problem. Such model differences
result in contrasting findings as mentioned earlier.
Other research related to our work is the literature
on combinatorial auctions, in which bidders can sub-
mit bids on bundles (or packages) of goods rather than
just individual items. When the bids are in the form of
price-quantity pairs, bidders engage in supply function
competition (Klemperer and Meyer 1989, Vives 2011).
The appealing characteristic of a combinatorial auction
is that it can capture the complementarities or syner-
gies among goods. Cramton et al. (2006) provide an
excellent exposition on this topic from an interdisci-
plinary perspective of economics, operations research,
and computer science. Combinatorial auctions have
seen widespread applications in many areas, includ-
ing industrial procurement, radio spectrum and trans-
portation (Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2004, Cramton
et al. 2006). Despite the compelling motivation of
allowing complementarity among goods, combinato-
rial auctions struggle with the winner determination
problem and the extensive computational burdens for
bidders because of the exploding number of bids
involved in the bidding process. Our model shares a
similar feature in that the auctioneer faces a combi-
natorial optimization problem (analogous to the win-
ner determination problem in combinatorial auctions).
However, we show that this optimization problem is
easy to solve in our model because bidders each sub-
mit a single (two-part) bid rather thanmultiple bids for
different bundles of goods. In addition, our focus is on
understanding the competitive dynamics in a market
where the single buyer reserves capacity in advance
to hedge against future demand uncertainty and spot
price uncertainty, an element missing in the combina-
torial auction literature.
Finally, our paper is loosely related to a broad lit-
erature on cooperative games (Shapley 1971, Myerson
1991). Cooperative game theory abstracts away from
the detailed actions of the players and focuses on
what a group of players can achieve (Osborne and
Rubinstein 1994, Peleg and Sudholter 2003). In con-
trast, our model of a price auction is a noncooperative
game, where an outcome is a profile of pricing deci-
sions made by the suppliers. Moreover, our model is a
Stackelberg game, in which the suppliers are the lead-
ers and the buyer is a follower. Nevertheless, the equi-
libria that occur in our model are in the core (one of the
main solution concepts in cooperative games) for an
appropriately constructed cooperative game, in which
a coalition is formed between the buyer and a subset of
suppliers.
3. The Model
We consider a supply chain with n suppliers and one
buyer who faces random demand D. Before demand
occurs, the buyer can reserve capacity that is offered in
blocks by these n suppliers and pay a reservation price.
After demand occurs, the buyer will meet the demand
(up to the total amount of capacity reserved) and at
this point pays an additional (execution) price for the
capacity that is used. In addition to the reserved capac-
ity, there is also a spot market from which the buyer
can purchase to meet demand. We consider an open
spot market where there is a much larger set of suppli-
ers than are involved in bidding for contracts with this
particular buyer; see Wu and Kleindorfer (2005) for a
similar assumption. In the open spot market, no player
can exercise market power to manipulate the (random)
spot price P0. Ourmodel allows P0 to be correlatedwith
the demand D. Denote by G¯(t , p) the complementary
cumulative probability for their joint distribution, i.e.,
G¯(t , p) Pr[D > t ,P0 > p].
Decisions on the capacity to reserve are made prior
to P0 and D being realized, but the actual use of that
capacity relies on there being sufficient demand and
the spot market price being sufficiently high. The buyer
is paid a price ρ for each unit of demand that can be
met. We assume the upper bound of P0 is no greater
than ρ so that demand will be always fulfilled. This is
without loss of generality because, once violated, we
can define a newvariable P˜0min(ρ,P0) and replace P0
with P˜0; then all the results will follow.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
37
.20
5.2
02
.17
] o
n 2
6 J
un
e 2
01
7, 
at 
01
:18
 . F
or
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Anderson, Chen, and Shao: Supplier Competition with Option Contracts
Operations Research, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–16, ©2017 The Author(s) 5
Suppliers each dedicate a block of capacity to bid
into the option market and do not use this capacity
in the spot market; in Section 6 we relax this assump-
tion by allowing suppliers to sell the unused capacity
to the spot market. The suppliers each try to maximize
their expected profits by choosing reservation prices ri
and execution prices pi , given their reservation costs ei ,
execution costs ci , and block size Ki , where i ∈ N {1, . . . , n}. Note that both pi and ri are prices per unit,
so the buyer needs to pay an amount riKi to reserve
block i. If not all of the block is required when demand
occurs and the spot price is realized, say, an amount w
is needed, then the buyer pays an execution cost of
piw < piKi .
Overall, we analyze a two-stage model. In the first
stage suppliers each simultaneously submit a bid con-
sisting of a reservation price and an execution price.
Given these supplier bids, the buyer decides which
blocks to reserve. In the second stage, both demand
and spot price are realized, and the buyer decides how
much reserved capacity to execute and how much to
purchase from the spot market. We can see that it is a
Stackelberg game where the suppliers are leaders and
the buyer is a follower. The suppliers compete in the
option market, and we use the concept of Nash equi-
librium to study the suppliers’ bidding behavior.
For convenience of presentation, we assume that all
execution prices {pi : i ∈ N} are distinct and label the
bids so that p1 < p2 < · · · < pn . Suppliers will not offer
an execution price higher than the unit revenue, so it is
reasonable to assume ρ > pn . We suppose that the joint
distribution G¯ and unit revenue ρ together with all the
costs ei and ci (i  1, 2, . . . , n) are common knowledge;
see similar assumptions made by Martínez-de-Albéniz
and Simchi-Levi (2009).
Given the set of bids B  {(pi , ri ,Ki): i ∈ N}, the
buyer decides which blocks to reserve. For any S ⊆ N ,
we denote by S(B)∗ the optimal set of bids for the
buyergiven that the choice ismade fromamongbidders
in S. Here the optimality is with respect to maximizing
the total expected buyer’s profit ΠB(X) from bidders
in X; i.e.,
S(B)∗  arg max
X⊆S
ΠB(X). (1)
When there is no confusion over the bids considered,
we drop indication of B from notation (1).
The solution to the right-hand side of Equation (1)
may not be unique. Since the buyer’s choice has an
impact on the suppliers’ decisions, we need to give a
definite description of the buyer’s behavior when dif-
ferent choices yield the same expected profit for the
buyer. As mentioned earlier, the problem faced by the
suppliers and the buyer forms a Stackelberg gamewith
multiple leaders and thus involves bilevel optimiza-
tion (see, e.g., Dempe 2002). There are several alterna-
tive approaches to the issue of possible multiple solu-
tions of the lower-level problem, “each requiring some
assumptions about the level of cooperation between
the players” (Dempe 2002, p. 28). Drawing on the
bilevel programming literature, we will adopt the opti-
mistic approach with the economic interpretation that
the follower is willing to support the leaders. On the
other hand, the Bertrand-Edgeworth rationing rules
(see, e.g., Levitan and Shubik 1972) on market share
in competitive pricing treat zero-profit strategies as a
limit of iterative competition. Either approach leads us
to the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Tie-Breaking Rule). If two sets of blocks
give the same (maximum) expected profit, the buyer chooses
the set of more blocks.
Note that the above rule arises from a situation
where a supplier has an incentive to constantly adjust
his bidding so that his marginal contribution to the
total expected profit of the buyer remains positive (to
keep himself selected by the buyer) but is infinitesi-
mally small. This type of situation in a supply chain
has also been dealt with by Du et al. (2014, Section 2.2)
using the optimistic approach.
Now let us consider how the buyer makes a choice
between two equal-cardinality sets of blocks, each giving
themaximum expected profit. Interestingly, our results
will hold under any rule for breaking such a tie as long
as such a rule is known to the suppliers and satisfies
the following desirable property of consistency:
Assumption 2 (Independence Axiom). If two equal-cardi-
nality sets of blocks give the same marginal expected profit
in the optimal selection of the buyer, then her preference of
one over another is independent of the availability of any
additional block.
It is natural to suppose that if set A of blocks is pre-
ferred to setB ofblocks, then this is still the casewhenan
additional block ` becomes available but is not part of
thebuyer’s optimal selection.The IndependenceAxiom
implies that if the additional block ` does become part
of the optimal selection and both A and B would con-
tribute the same marginal expected profit (albeit pos-
sibly smaller than when ` was unavailable), then the
above property says that A is still preferred to B by the
buyer. Such a property, which is an axiom in decision
theoryandalsoknownas Independence of IrrelevantAlter-
natives insocialchoice theoryproposedbyArrow(1953),
is desirable to avoid strategic manipulation: if candi-
date x is preferred to candidate y, then the presence of
a third candidate zmust not make y preferable to x.
The Independence Axiom can be satisfied by many
decision rules. A very simple one is that the buyer
always prefers the set of blocks that is lexicographi-
cally largest when each set of blocks is represented by
the sequence of its block indices in descending order.
Another natural decision rule is to give preference to
the selection with the best worst-case profit for the
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buyer. The worst case occurs when reserved blocks are
not required because of low spot price or low demand.
This leads to a decision rule that prefers sets of blocks
with a low value of the sum of ri values.
To further understand the dynamics in the Stackel-
berg game, we follow the standard backward induction
approach: we first consider an optimal policy for the
buyer and then turn to considering the optimal behav-
ior and the equilibria for the suppliers.
4. The Buyer’s Selection of Suppliers
We start with a general case in which blocks can be of
any size. Later we will restrict our attention to the case
with equal-size blocks, for which we are able to obtain
richer results.
4.1. Capacity Blocks of General Sizes
The buyer makes a two-stage decision that involves
the reservation choice prior to knowing actual demand
and spot price and the execution decision when both
demand and spot price are known. We begin with the
analysis of the execution decision given the buyer’s
reservation choice.
Given bids B  {(pi , ri ,Ki): i ∈ N}, suppose the
buyer’s reservation set is {(pi , ri ,Ki): i ∈ S ⊆ N}, where
S  { j1 , . . . , jv} with j1 < · · · < jv . (2)
It is convenient to denote by Yi the total capacity of the
first i blocks in S. Thus
Yi 
i∑
m1
K jm , i  1, . . . , v. (3)
At the time when actual demand and spot price are
known, the buyer can fulfill customer demand by using
the reserved capacity and spot purchases. Our first
observation, simple but important, is that once a set
of blocks has been reserved (and reservation payments
made), when demand occurs the blocks that are used
will be those that have the cheapest execution prices. In
other words, the blocks will be used in increasing order
of execution price, so the buyer will first use block j1,
then j2, etc. Not all the v blocks will necessarily be used
since demand may not require it, or at a certain point
it may be cheaper to purchase from the spot market.
For any realized demand t and spot price p0, we
denote by xi(t , p0) the amount of capacity from sup-
plier ji that is used. In light of the above observation,
we obtain
xi(t , p0)
{
min{(t −Yi−1)+ ,K ji }, if p ji 6 p0 ,
0, otherwise,
where (z)+  max{z , 0}, and the purchase amount
from the spot market is t −∑vi1 xi(t , p0). The buyer’s
expected profit from reserving S in the option market
(as well as purchasing in the spot market) is then
given by
Π(S)
v∑
i1
((ρ− p ji )ƐD ,P0[xi(D ,P0)] − r jiK ji )︸¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨︷︷¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨︸
expected profit from reserving bids in S
+ ƐD ,P0
[
(ρ−P0)
(
D −
v∑
i1
xi(D ,P0)
)]
︸¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨︷︷¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨︸
expected profit from purchasing in spot market
, (4)
where the expectations are taken over D and P0. We
note that ƐD ,P0[xi(D ,P0)] measures the expected used
capacity from supplier ji . The first and second terms in
Π(S) represent the buyer’s profits from purchasing in
the option market and the spot market, respectively.
It is worth mentioning that our model also deals
with the case where there is no spot market simply
by setting the random variable P0 to be equal to ρ. In
this special case, the buyer will meet demand by using
supply options only, and her expected profit becomes
Π(S)
v∑
i1
((ρ− p ji )ƐD[min{(t −Yi−1)+ ,K ji }] − r jiK ji ) .
One can see that the consideration of a spot mar-
ket does not structurally change the buyer’s expected
profit function because from the buyer’s perspective
the spot market can be thought of as a nonstrategic
supplier who has unlimited capacity, zero reservation
price, and (stochastic) execution price P0.
One strategy for the buyer is to reserve no capacity
and rely entirely on the spot market. We write W for
the expected profit under this policy. Hence, we obtain
W  ƐD ,P0[(ρ−P0)D].
Having defined W , we can reformulate the expected
profit for the buyer:
Π(S)
v∑
i1
ƐD ,P0[(P0 − p ji )xi(D ,P0) − r jiK ji ]+W. (5)
From Equation (5) we observe that ƐD ,P0[(P0 − p ji ) ·
xi(D ,P0) − r jiK ji ] measures the (expected) extra profit
the buyer canmake from reserving block ji in compari-
son with the profit by relying on the spot market alone.
Clearly, in the special case where P0 is extremely small,
then option contracts may not bring any value to the
buyer, and thus the buyer may rely on the spot market
only. Since W is a constant, the buyer essentially max-
imizes the sum of these additional profits by choosing
the optimal (sub)set of suppliers in the option market.
We now explore the property of the set function
Π(X)with X ⊆N . The following lemma shows the sub-
modularity of Π(X), which is related to the economic
phenomenon of diminishing returns.
Lemma 1 (Submodularity for Buyer Profit). The set func-
tion Π(X) with X ⊆ N is submodular.
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The submodularity of Π(X) implies that the mar-
ginal contribution of a block to the buyer’s expected
profit is smaller when the existing set of blocks is
larger; i.e., for any blocks i , j and subset S, we have
Π(S ∪ {i , j}) −Π(S ∪ { j}) 6 Π(S ∪ {i}) −Π(S). We can
see that Π(X) is nonmonotone; i.e., the relationship
X′ ⊆ X′′ does not necessarily implyΠ(X′)6Π(X′′) since
the marginal contribution of a block could be negative
if it is forced into the choice set.
The intuition of Lemma 1 is as follows. Submodular-
ity concerns how the addition of a block, say i, to the
existing blocks affects the buyer’s expected profit. First
note that the reservation payments for block i are the
same, regardless of the existing blocks. Thus we focus
on the effect on the buyer’s expected profit (exclud-
ing reservation payments), termed as the expected exe-
cution profit. Depending on the relationship between pi
and the execution prices of existing blocks, we have
two cases: (i) pi is the largest, and then the addition
of block i will not affect the rankings of the exist-
ing blocks, and (ii) pi is not the largest, and then the
existing blocks with execution prices greater than pi
will be pushed backward (note that we sort blocks in
increasing order of execution price). This will affect
the buyer’s expected execution profit in three ways: (a)
the buyer’s profit is increased by meeting the demand
using block i thatwas previously unmet; (b) the buyer’s
profit by using block i is larger, when satisfying certain
demand that was previously satisfied by other blocks
with larger execution prices; (c) the buyer’s expected
execution profit from those affected blocks is reduced
because there is a smaller chance for them to be used
when demand occurs. The proof of the lemma shows
that with a larger existing set, the addition of block
i will either make the positive effects (a) and (b) less
prominent and/or make the negative effect (c) more
prominent, depending on the positions of block i in the
existing sets. As a result, the marginal value of block i
is smaller when the existing set is larger, leading to the
submodularity property of Π(X).
The buyer’s problem is to find a set S ⊆ N that maxi-
mizes the submodular function Π(S): maxS⊆NΠ(S). In
general, it is NP-hard tomaximize a nonmonotone sub-
modular function since it includes computing the max-
imum cut of a graph as a special case (Feige et al. 2011).
Next we will show that for the case with equal-size
blocks, an efficient algorithm can be developed to solve
for the buyer’s optimal choice set in polynomial time.
4.2. Capacity Blocks of an Equal Size
When all the suppliers have equal-size blocks, we can
establish stronger results.Without loss of generality we
take Ki  1. In this case Π(S) can be rewritten as
Π(S)
v∑
i1
(∫ i
i−1
(∫ ρ
p ji
G¯(t , p) dp
)
dt − r ji
)
+W. (6)
In fact, this is a special case of a more general result
when blocks have unequal sizes that we give as
Lemma 5 in the appendix.
Suppose that a block with prices (pk , rk) is not in
the optimal choice set of the buyer; then substituting
this block for any of the accepted blocks (p ji , r ji ) cannot
improve Π(S). Hence
rk> r ji −
∫ i
i−1
(∫ ρ
p ji
G¯(t ,p)dp
)
dt+
∫ i
i−1
(∫ ρ
pk
G¯(t ,p)dp
)
dt .
This shows that the point (pk , rk) lies above the func-
tion
r˜i(y)
 r ji −
∫ i
i−1
(∫ ρ
p ji
G¯(t , p)dp
)
dt+
∫ i
i−1
(∫ ρ
y
G¯(t , p)dp
)
dt ,
which passes through the point (p ji , r ji ) associatedwith
block ji . Observe that ∂r˜i(y)/∂y < 0 and it is increasing
in y (since G¯(t , p) is decreasing in p), so r˜i(y) is a con-
vex decreasing function. This implies that the rejected
blocks all lie above the (convex) upper envelope of
these r˜i(y) (i  1, . . . , v) functions associated with all
the accepted blocks. Indeed, we can see exactly this
kind of behavior in the shape of the accepted block
region that occurs in Figure 1.
We now consider the problem where the buyer is
restricted to choose a subset with k elements. We have
the following property for the buyer’s optimal choice.
Lemma 2 (Buyer’s Nested Choices).When blocks are of an
equal size, the optimal buyer’s choice when restricted to at
most k blocks can be chosen as a subset of the optimal buyer’s
choice when restricted to at most k + 1 blocks.
Lemma 2 shows that when suppliers offer equal-size
blocks, the buyer’s optimal decision is nested, in the
sense that the optimal choice of k blocks is a subset of
that of k+1 blocks. This result makes the buyer’s prob-
lem quite straightforward to solve using a dynamic
programming approach. We simply solve the problem
with a fixed number k of blocks, starting with k  1
and then increasing k by one at a time. At each stage
there are less than n options to consider as we add each
of the possible blocks into the reservation set one at a
time. In fact, it can be shown that once we stop mak-
ing an improvement by adding another block, then we
have found an optimal solution.
The buyer’s computational problem can be formu-
lated as a shortest path problem, similar to the one
in Schummer and Vohra (2003) for the minimum cost
problem, which has a time complexity of O(n2d4max),
where dmax is an upper bound of total demand. With
time complexity of O(ndmax), our dynamic program-
ming approach is more efficient.
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Lemma 1 has shown that the buyer’s profit function
Π(X) is submodular. The next result establishes that
with equal-size blocks, this property is inherited by the
functionΠ∗(X), which takes the best buyer profit given
a set of available blocks X ⊆ N :
Π∗(X)max
S⊆X
Π(S). (7)
Theorem 1 (Submodularity for Optimal Buyer Profit).
When blocks are of an equal size, the set functionΠ∗(X)with
X ⊆ N is submodular.
Theorem 1 shows that the optimal buyer profit, as
a set function, is also submodular. The theorem is
quite complex to establish because we need to track the
change of the buyer’s optimal choice when an addi-
tional block is available. We offer some intuitive expla-
nations here. With equal-size blocks, the selection of
an additional block ` has rather limited effects on the
buyer’s choice over existing blocks (see Lemma 8 in the
proof for details): first, any block that is not chosen in
the absence of block ` will still not be chosen in the
presence of block `; second, there is at most one exist-
ing block that is chosenwhen block ` is unavailable but
will not be chosen when block ` is available. Conse-
quently, the additional value added by block ` occurs
because (i) block ` has more competitive prices than
the dropped block or (ii) the buyer simply requires it
to meet certain demand (without affecting the exist-
ing blocks). The proof shows that if the existing set is
larger, it is less likely that block `will be chosen or used
(even if it is chosen) by the buyer. In other words, there
will be smaller incidence of block ` being more com-
petitive, or there will be a smaller chance that block `
will be used by the buyer when demand occurs. As a
consequence, the optimal buyer’s profit function is also
submodular.
The result of Theorem 1 does not carry over to the
case with unequal-size blocks as demonstrated by the
following example.
Example 1. Submodularity fails when blocks do not have
the same size. Suppose that demand takes only the sin-
gle value 10, the unit selling price ρ  50, and the spot
price is also assumed to be 50. We have 5 blocks avail-
able {a , b , c , g , h} with (pi , ri ,Ki) triples as follows: a 
b  c  (1, 10, 4) and g  h  (1, 7, 5). Then Π({a , b}) 
49 × 8 − (10 × 8)  312, Π({a , g})  49 × 9 − (10 × 4) −
(7 × 5)  366, Π({a , b , c})  49 × 10 − (10 × 12)  370,
Π({a , b , g})49×10−(10×8)−(7×5)375,Π({g , h})
49× 10− (10× 7) 420. Hence we see that
Π∗({a , b , c})Π({a , b , c}) 370,
Π∗({a , b , c , g})Π∗({a , b , c , h})Π({a , b , g}) 375,
Π∗({a , b , c , g , h})Π({g , h}) 420.
ThusΠ∗({a , b , c})+Π∗({a , b , c , g , h})>Π∗({a , b , c , g})+
Π∗({a , b , c , h}), contradicting submodularity. 
The reason why submodularity does not hold for
the general case is as follows. Unlike the case with
equal-size blocks, the buyer’s optimal choice depends
not only on bidding prices but also on block sizes,
where the latter determine how a block fits with other
blocks. As a result, the addition of a block may have
substantial impact on the buyer’s choice over existing
blocks. Specifically, as opposed to Lemma 8, the previ-
ously unaccepted blocks may be chosen (e.g., because
these blocks match the new block better), or there
may be more than one block that will be deselected
(e.g., because the new block has a large size). For
example, as illustrated by the above example, when
block h is added to the set {a , b , c , g}, the buyer’s opti-
mal choice switches from {a , b , g} to {g , h}, leaving
both a and b out. This is not surprising because the
block size of h is 5, which together with g just matches
the total demand. Therefore, if blocks are of different
sizes, the marginal contribution of an additional block
may be bigger when the existing set of blocks is larger
since this may enable more ways of combining differ-
ent blocks to better suit the demand. This explains the
failure of submodularity for the optimal buyer’s profit.
It is worth comparing the above theorem with
Lemma 1. On the surface, Theorem 1 shows submod-
ularity for the buyer’s optimal expected profit function
Π∗( · ), which by definition is monotone since the buyer
will not select an additional block if it decreases her
expected profit. This is in contrast with profit function
Π( · ), which is not monotone. In contrast to Π∗( · ), the
submodularity of Π( · ) does not rely on the assump-
tion of equal-size blocks because blocks are forced into
the buyer’s choice set, and we do not need to consider
the fit between different blocks. In a nutshell, the two
results are driven by different driving forces as dis-
cussed earlier. From a technical point of view, the endo-
geneity of the buyer’s decision greatly complicates the
analysis. Since the buyer is a profit maximizer in our
model, the theorem plays an important role in subse-
quent equilibrium analysis.
5. The Suppliers’ Bidding Competition
After understanding the buyer’s reservation behavior,
we are now in a position to examine the best responses
and the equilibria for suppliers.
5.1. Best Response Strategies
Let us start with an examination of a supplier’s best
response to the bids of the other suppliers. We look at
how supplier ` responds to bids of suppliers LN\{`}
by a choice of (p` , r`). Using the notation in (1), we
write N ∗ and L∗, respectively, for the optimal buyer’s
choice from the set of bids N and L. We write pi`(p` , r`)
for the expected profit for supplier ` if he makes an
offer with execution price p` and reservation price r` ,
assuming a fixed set of bids by the suppliers L. We
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are interested in the optimal choices of p` and r` to
maximize pi` . Notice that for any given value of p` , it
is optimal for supplier ` to set r` as high as possible,
subject to the proviso that the bid ` is still chosen by
the buyer. We have the following result for supplier `’s
best response.
Theorem 2 (Best Response). Given bids {(pi , ri ,Ki):
i ∈ L} it is optimal for supplier ` to choose p∗`  c` .
Theorem 2 shows that in an optimal solution, sup-
pliers charge only costs for their execution prices
but make profits from the buyer’s reservation pay-
ments. We find that setting p∗`  c` will maximize
the total supply chain surplus. Since the supplier’s
profit equals the total surplus less the buyer’s original
profit Π∗B(L), such a bidding strategy must also maxi-
mize the supplier’s profit. Let B′  {(pi , ri ,Ki): i ∈ L} ∪
{(c` , e` ,K`)} so that block ` is offered at cost. The proof
of the theorem reveals that for the optimal solution
with p∗`  c` , we have r
∗
`  e` + (Π∗B′(N) − Π∗B(L))/K` .
Therefore, supplier `’s optimal expected profit is pi∗` 
Π∗
B′(N) −Π∗B(L). This is the supplier `’s marginal con-
tribution to the supply chain with the existing bids
{(pi , ri ,Ki): i ∈ L}. Supplier ` is able to extract all the
marginal surpluses because the buyer in our model
makes an all-or-nothing decision, which significantly
limits her choice flexibility. Given the reserved amount
is predetermined (which equals block size K`), sup-
plier ` does not need to use prices to intervene the
buyer’s decision on how much to reserve.
The optimal bidding strategy p∗`  c` mirrors a result
of Wu and Kleindorfer (2005). Our result complements
theirs by extending the finding to a discrete version of
the problem where each supplier’s capacity comes as
a block. The above result is in sharp contrast with that
of Martínez-de-Albéniz and Simchi-Levi (2009), where
p∗`  c` does not hold and suppliers cannot take all the
marginal surpluses. More specifically, the authors find
that supplier ` will bid infinitely close to some other
bid that affects how much the buyer will reserve from
him (see Theorem 2 therein). In their model the buyer’s
decision on how much to reserve is endogenous and
depends critically on supplier bids (see Proposition 1
therein). As discussed by the authors, the buyer’s deci-
sion in their model extends the classical newsvendor
decision to multiple suppliers. Analogous to the dou-
ble marginalization effect in the selling-to-newsvendor
setting, it is not in supplier `’s best interest to maxi-
mize the total supply chain surplus by setting p∗`  c` .
Moreover, supplier ` cannot extract all the marginal
surpluses. In a similar vein, we show that the result
p∗`  c` fails to hold when suppliers ownmore than one
block or the buyer can reserve just part of a block (see
Section 6).
5.2. Equilibria with Blocks of an Equal Size
Having established the best response for each supplier,
we now investigate Nash equilibria among the n sup-
pliers. We start with the problem where blocks are of
an equal size and then consider the more general prob-
lem where suppliers may have blocks of unequal sizes.
Without loss of generality we take the block sizes as
Ki  1, i  1, 2, . . . , n. The suppliers are characterized by
their costs: C  {(c1 , e1), . . . , (cn , en)}. As before we will
assume c1 < c2 < · · · < cn for convenience of presenta-
tion, and based on Theorem 2 we can assume that each
supplier chooses an execution price pi  ci . Hence all
the execution prices are distinct.
We first present a key characteristic of an equilibrium
set of bids: at equilibrium the buyer’s optimal expected
profit remains the same when any individual block is
removed.
Lemma 3. Suppose all blocks are of an equal size and bidsB
form an equilibrium; then for any i ∈ N ,
Π∗B(N)Π∗B(N\{i}). (8)
Lemma 3 shows that the buyer’s expected profit will
not be affected by removing any individual block at
equilibrium. The intuition is that if the buyer makes
a lower profit when some block i is absent, then sup-
plier i can always increase his bidding price a little
while ensuring that block i is still selected by the buyer.
Now we will establish that any equilibrium with
p∗i  ci remains an equilibrium after the unchosen sup-
pliers have their reservation prices reduced to reserva-
tion costs. Moreover, this process does not change the
buyer’s choice set.
Lemma 4. Suppose all blocks are of an equal size. Let bids
B  {(ci , ri): i ∈ N} be an equilibrium and S ⊆ N be any
subset of the blocks not selected by the buyer under B. Then
the bids
BˆB\{(ci , ri): i ∈ S} ∪ {(ci , ei): i ∈ S},
also form an equilibrium. Moreover, N(Bˆ)∗  N(B)∗, and
thus Π∗
Bˆ
(N)Π∗B(N).
With these lemmas we are ready to characterize the
equilibrium for suppliers.
Theorem 3 (Nash Equilibrium for Equal-Size Blocks).
When all blocks are of an equal size, the bids B∗  {(ci , r∗i ):
i ∈ N} form a Nash equilibrium, where r∗i  ei +Π∗C(N) −
Π∗C(N\{i}) for i ∈ N . Moreover, at any equilibrium with
p∗i  ci , i ∈ N , the buyer chooses the supply chain optimal
set N(C)∗, and supplier i makes a profit pi∗i  Π∗C(N) −
Π∗C(N\{i}).
Theorem 3 shows that at equilibrium each sup-
plier charges her execution costs only and adds a pre-
mium to her reservation costs. Thus, suppliers make
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profits from the buyer’s reservation payments only.
By signing an option contract, suppliers share some
demand risk with the buyer. The result p∗i  ci sug-
gests that suppliers tend to eliminate the consequence
of this risk because they always break even, regard-
less of how much reserved capacity is used by the
buyer. Wu and Kleindorfer (2005) also show that exe-
cution price equals execution cost, but the reservation
price presents a different structure from ours. Specifi-
cally, the authors show that any equilibrium must be
symmetric for all the selected suppliers, where they
enjoy the same contract price (see Theorem 2 therein).
Most importantly, Theorem 3 implies that the existence
of equilibrium is guaranteed in our model, whereas
there may be no equilibrium in their model.
In sharp contrast, Martínez-de-Albéniz and Simchi-
Levi (2009) show that in a continuous version of such
a problem without capacity constraints, suppliers offer
bids that cluster together in groups of two to three,
a phenomenon termed as “cluster competition.” The
implication of their result is that suppliers compete
with those with similar costs, and hence at equilibrium
the market will be segmented by groups of similar
technologies.
The equilibrium stated in Theorem 3 is not unique.
This occurs because the unchosen suppliers can set
their reservation prices to any values no less than their
reservation costs (see Lemma 4). Although there may
be multiple equilibrium bidding strategies, all equi-
libria lead to the same profit allocation: each supplier
makes a profit equal to his marginal contribution to the
supply chain optimal profit, and the buyer takes the
remaining profit. More specifically, supplier i makes a
nonnegative profit, i.e., pi∗i  Π
∗
C(N) − Π∗C(N\{i}) > 0,
and the buyer’s profit is equal to the supply chain opti-
mal profit less the sum of the chosen suppliers’ profits,
which is given by
Π∗B∗ Π
∗
C(N) −
∑
i∈N(C)∗
pi∗i
Π∗C(N) −
∑
i∈N(C)∗
(Π∗C(N) −Π∗C(N\{i})).
It is clear that the buyer’s equilibrium profit must be
nonnegative since otherwise she would simply reserve
no blocks. This also emerges from the monotonicity of
the function Π∗B( · ). The following example illustrates
the profit allocation stated in the theorem.
Example 2. Suppose the random demand is given by
Pr[D  i]  1/4 for i  0, 1, 2, 3. The retail price is ρ  5.
The spot price is given by Pr[P0  1.5]  Pr[P0  3.5]
 1/2. For simplicity we assume D and P0 are inde-
pendent. Three suppliers each have a unit-block with
respective execution costs c1  1, c2  2, and c3  3, and
their reservation costs are e1  e2  e3  0. Thus we can
write C  {(1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0)}. Using Equation (4), we
Table 1. With All Bids Accepted the Buyer’s Execution
Decision for Different Values of Demand and Spot Price
t p0 Pr[t , p0] x1(t , p0) x2(t , p0) x3(t , p0) t −∑3i1 xi(t , p0)
0 1.5 1/8 0 0 0 0
1 1.5 1/8 1 0 0 0
2 1.5 1/8 1 0 0 1
3 1.5 1/8 1 0 0 2
0 3.5 1/8 0 0 0 0
1 3.5 1/8 1 0 0 0
2 3.5 1/8 1 1 0 0
3 3.5 1/8 1 1 1 0
can calculate the supply chain profitΠC(S) for any sub-
set S ⊆N  {1, 2, 3}. TakeΠC(N), for example, where all
the three unit-blocks are chosen. For each combination
of realized demand t and spot price p0, we then have
the buyer’s execution decision as shown in Table 1.
Note that the last column contains the purchase
amounts from the spot market. Using Equation (4) we
obtain
ΠC(N) 68 (5− 1) − 0+ 28 (5− 2) − 0+ 18 (5− 3)
− 0+ 1+ 28 (5− 1.5)
85
16 .
Similarly, we can calculate other supply chain profits
as follows:
ΠC(N\{1}) 7116 , ΠC(N\{2}) 8016 ,
ΠC(N\{3}) 8416 ; ΠC({1}) 7816 ,
ΠC({2}) 6916 , ΠC({3}) 6316 .
Therefore, the supply chain optimal set is N and in
equilibrium bids B∗  {(ci , r∗i ): i  1, 2, 3} we have r∗1 
7/8, r∗2  5/16, and r∗3  1/16, which lead to the follow-
ing profit allocation among the buyer and the three
suppliers:
Π∗B∗ 
65
16 , pi
∗
1 
7
8 , pi
∗
2 
5
16 , pi
∗
3 
1
16 . 
The profit allocation in equilibrium can be quite
diverse, depending on the values of system parame-
ters. Consider two polar cases. First, in the case where
suppliers engage in head-to-head competition so that
each supplier’s marginal contribution to the system
is null, then the buyer will take the entire supply
chain optimal profit, a result analogous to the (sym-
metric) Bertrand competition equilibrium. In the other
polar case where suppliers complement each other in
achieving system maximum, the total profit may be
split between suppliers only. Thus it is possible for
suppliers, as the Stackelberg leaders, to extract most
of the supply chain profit, leaving the buyer a very
small profit.
Theorem 3 also shows that the supply chain is self-
coordinated in the sense that the buyer’s equilibrium
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choice of suppliers maximizes the system profit. This
result resonates with that ofWu and Kleindorfer (2005)
who show that the two-part options are efficient in
coordinating the supply chain, but the driving forces
are different. Wu and Kleindorfer show that “the ulti-
mate driver of [their] efficiency result is competition in
the presence of a backup open spot market” (p. 460),
whereas in our model the efficiency result does not
depend on the existence of a spot market. In fact, we
can show that all the results remain intact when spot
market is absent. Instead, the main driver in our model
lies in the all-or-nothing nature of the buyer’s decision.
The efficiency result is in contrast to that of the equiva-
lent noncombinatorial problem analyzed by Martínez-
de-Albéniz and Simchi-Levi (2009) where equilibria
may have a total loss up to 25% (and even more when
the demand distribution is not log-concave). The effi-
ciency loss comes from the fact that p∗`  c` may not
be optimal for supplier `: since the buyer’s reservation
quantity is endogenously determined by the prices, it
is not in each supplier’s best interest to maximize the
supply chain profit by setting p∗`  c` . As a consequence,
the results in Lemmas 3 and 4 do not hold in their
model either. The efficiency loss result is analogous
to the double marginalization effect that occurs in the
classical selling-to-newsvendor setting in the sense that
suppliers have to use prices to influence the buyer’s
quantity decision (Lariviere and Porteus 2001).
Theorem 3 also applies in the case that the spot price
is correlated with the demand. In this case the set of
blocks chosen at equilibrium, N(C)∗, can vary accord-
ing to the correlation.We illustrate this in the following
example.
Example 3. Following Ritchken and Tapiero (1986), we
suppose the random demand D and the spot price P0
follow a bivariate lognormal distribution, which is
parameterized by µd , µp , σd , σp , and r, where r is a
proxy for the correlation between D and P0. A positive
(negative) value of r indicates a positive (negative) cor-
relation. For this example, we use the following param-
eter values: µd  2, µp  1, σd  0.6, σp  0.35, and ρ  6.
Consistent with the fact that a higher demand often
leads to a higher spot price, we focus on the case of
Table 2. Effect of Correlation on Buyer’s Optimal Choice, Profit Allocation, and Value of Options
r Optimal choice SC S1 S2 S3 S4 Buyer W Option value
0 {1, 3, 4} 28.101 0.286 0.000 0.033 0.217 27.565 27.512 0.589
0.1 {1, 3, 4} 27.565 0.288 0.000 0.038 0.222 27.017 26.970 0.595
0.2 {1, 3, 4} 27.017 0.288 0.000 0.038 0.227 26.464 26.416 0.601
0.3 {1, 3, 4} 26.457 0.288 0.000 0.037 0.228 25.903 25.850 0.607
0.4 {1, 3, 4} 25.883 0.288 0.000 0.037 0.226 25.332 25.272 0.612
0.5 {1, 3, 4} 25.297 0.288 0.000 0.037 0.225 24.748 24.682 0.615
0.6 {1, 2, 3, 4} 24.703 0.293 0.005 0.042 0.228 24.135 24.079 0.624
0.7 {1, 2, 3, 4} 24.098 0.302 0.014 0.050 0.235 23.497 23.464 0.634
0.8 {1, 2, 3, 4} 23.478 0.309 0.021 0.057 0.240 22.851 22.835 0.643
0.9 {1, 2, 3, 4} 22.841 0.314 0.026 0.061 0.244 22.197 22.193 0.648
positive correlationwith r increasing from 0 to 0.9 with
a step size 0.1 (we do not include r  1 because the joint
probability density function for this instance involves
infinity). Four suppliers each have a unit-block with
respective execution costs c1  0.5, c2  1.3, c3  1.8, and
c4  2.2 and reservation costs e1  2, e2  1.5, e3  1,
and e4  0.5. Thus we can write C  {(0.5, 2), (1.3, 1.5),
(1.8, 1), (2.2, 0.5)}.
Using Equation (4), we can numerically calculate
the supply chain profit ΠC(S) for any subset S ⊆ N 
{1, 2, 3, 4}. Table 2 shows the buyer’s optimal choice,
the profit split among players, and the value of option
contracts in equilibrium.
The second column of Table 2 reveals that when the
correlation is high enough (i.e., r > 0.6) the buyer’s
optimal choice switches from {1, 3, 4} to {1, 2, 3, 4}. It
is to be expected that high correlation makes option
contracts more attractive since the high demand cases
when having more options is helpful are likely to
involve high spot prices, making it unattractive to
meet demand through the spot market. Related to this
observation, the last column shows that the value of
option contracts increases with the correlation. Simi-
lar results have been found in Ritchken and Tapiero
(1986). We also observe from Table 2 that both the sup-
ply chain optimal profit and the buyer’s profit decrease
in the correlation (see columns SC and Buyer). This
arises from the existence of the term W in the buyer
(or supply chain) profit, where W  ƐD ,P0[(ρ − P0)D]).
On the other hand we note that individual suppliers’
profits may not be monotone in the correlation (see
columns S1–S4). 
5.3. Equilibria with Blocks of Unequal Sizes
In this subsection, we show how to construct an equi-
librium when suppliers have blocks of unequal sizes.
Let C  {(ci , ei ,Ki): i ∈ N}, and N(C)∗  { j1 , . . . , jm},
which is an optimal buyer’s choice when each supplier
offers at cost.
Following the result of Theorem 2, we focus on the
bidding strategies with execution price equal to exe-
cution cost. We adjust suppliers’ reservation prices
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by following a recursive procedure. Define {B(k): k 
0, . . . ,m} recursively as follows:
B(0) C; B(k) B(k−1)\{(c jk , e jk ,K jk )} ∪ {(c jk , r∗jk ,K jk )},
k  1, . . . ,m ,
where
r∗jk  (Π∗B(k−1)(N) −Π∗B(k−1)(N\{ jk}))/K jk + e jk . (9)
At the initial step (k  0), we set price to be cost
for all blocks. Thus, solving the buyer’s problem is
equivalent to solving the supply chain optimal prob-
lem. In the next, we adjust the reservation prices for
the blocks in N(C)∗ one at a time. Specifically, at
step k > 0, we keep increasing the reservation price
of block jk until it is dropped by the buyer. This
leads to the maximum allowable increase (Π∗
B(k−1)
(N) −
Π∗
B(k−1)
(N\{ jk}))/K jk . Thus, Equation (9) gives the maxi-
mum reservation price r∗jk . It is easy to see that r
∗
jk
> e jk ,
and hence no supplier will make a loss by using the
above bidding strategies. At the end of the final step m,
the procedure returns a set of bidsB(m)  {(ci , ei ,Ki): i ∈
N\N(C)∗}∪ {(ci , r∗i ,Ki): i ∈N(C)∗}, and it can be shown
to form an equilibrium in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Nash Equilibrium for Unequal-Size Blocks).
Even when blocks are not necessarily of an equal size, the set
of bidsB(m), defined above, forms an equilibrium.
Theorem 4 states that, in the above equilibrium, the
suppliers who are not in the supply chain optimal set,
offer prices equal to their costs, but the suppliers in the
supply chain optimal set add a margin to their reser-
vation costs. The equilibrium constructed in the proce-
dure ensures that the buyer’s optimal choice matches
the supply chain optimal set so that even with differ-
ent block sizes, the supply chain optimal result can still
be achieved. It also implies that there is always a Nash
equilibrium for the case with general-size blocks.
Note that in the construction we have assumed a
particular order for the blocks { j1 , . . . , jm} in N(C)∗. As
the example below demonstrates, different orders may
give different equilibria. Therefore, we can expect there
to be multiple equilibria with different profit alloca-
tions, despite the fact that in this class of equilibria the
buyer’s optimal choice is the same.
Example 4. Demand is fixed at 10, the retail price is 10,
and spot prices are assumed to be 10. There are four
blocks with (ci , ei ,Ki) triples as follows: a  (0, 3, 3), b (0, 1.5, 7), c  (0, 3, 2), and d  (0, 3, 8). The supply chain
optimal solution is {a , b}, which gives Π({a , b}) 80.5.
We also have
Π∗({b , c , d})Π({b , c}) 73.5,
Π∗({a , c , d})Π({c , d}) 70,
Π∗({a , b , c , d})Π({a , b}) 80.5,
Π∗({a , b , c})Π∗({a , b , d})Π({a , b}) 80.5.
One can see that the marginal contribution (to the opti-
mal supply chain profit) of each of c and d is zero. The
marginal contribution of a is 80.5 − 73.5  7, whereas
the marginal contribution of the supplier with bid b
is 80.5− 70  10.5. Note that when a is absent, block b
is still chosen, whereas when b is absent, a is not cho-
sen. The marginal contribution of 10.5 (of supplier b)
is actually the joint contribution of both a and b.
• If we start with block a, then the following bids
form an equilibrium: a  (0, 3+7/3), b  (0, 1.5+3.5/7),
c  (0, 3), and d  (0, 3). In this equilibrium, the buyer
will choose blocks {a , b}. Supplier a’s profit is 7, which
equals his marginal contribution. Supplier b’s profit is
3.5, which equals the joint contribution of suppliers a
and b less the contribution of supplier a.
• If we start with block b, then the following bids
form an equilibrium: a  (0, 3), b  (0, 1.5+ 10.5/7), c 
(0, 3), and d  (0, 3). In this equilibrium, the buyer will
choose blocks {a , b}. Supplier b makes a profit of 10.5.
Profit of supplier a is 0, which is less than his marginal
contribution.
We have constructed two equilibria by changing the
orders of blocks. In both equilibria the buyer’s opti-
mal choice is {a , b}, but the profit splits are different.
In contrast to the outcomes in Theorem 3, suppliers
may make a profit that is less than their marginal
contribution. 
The equilibria in Theorem 4 are reminiscent of the
core of a cooperative game. It is interesting to establish
the connection between our results and the core of the
corresponding cooperative game (M, v), which is char-
acterized by (i) the set of all players is M  N ∪ {B},
where B represents the buyer and N  {1, . . . , n} is
the set of n suppliers, and (ii) the value/characteristic
function is given by, for any S ⊆M, v(S)Π∗C(S\{B}) if
B ∈ S, and v(S) 0 if B < S. It is clear that, if the buyer is
included in the set S, v(S) is the optimal supply chain
profit when blocks S\{B} are available. Reflecting the
fact that only when suppliers are paired with the buyer
can there be positive profits, the optimal supply chain
profit will be zero when the buyer is not included in
the set.
Cooperative game theory abstracts away from the
detailed strategies of players and focuses on the for-
mation and the division schemes of coalitions. Follow-
ing the literature of cooperative game theory (Osborne
and Rubinstein 1994), we concentrate on the case in
which a grand coalition forms so that the players in M
cooperate successfully. An allocation a  (a1 , . . . , an , aB)
is a vector of values or profits assigned to all players,
where ai denotes supplier i’s profit and aB denotes the
buyer’s profit.
The core of the cooperative game (M, v) is the set of
allocations for which no coalition is able to improve
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its aggregate profit by walking away from the allo-
cation policy. An allocation a is in the core if it sat-
isfies the following conditions: (i) ∑i∈M ai  v(M) and
(ii) a(S) > v(S) for all S ⊆M, where the total value
assigned to a subset S ⊆ M is a(S)  ∑i∈S ai . A con-
dition equivalent to (ii) is (ii′) a(S) 6 v(M) − v(M\S)
for all S ⊆M, meaning that no subset of players can
make a profit larger than their marginal contribution
as a whole.
Having set up the cooperative game (M, v), we are
now ready to establish the connection between the
equilibria and the core of the cooperative game.
Proposition 1. The profit allocations of the equilibria in
Theorem 4 are in the core of the cooperative game (M, v).
Though the profit splits for the constructed equilib-
ria are in the core of the corresponding cooperative
game, the core contains solutions that are not equilib-
ria, as we show in the following example.
Example 5. Demand is fixed at 15, the retail price is
ρ  10, and spot prices are assumed to be 10. There are
four blocks with (c , e ,K) triples as follows: i  (0, 4, 5),
j  k  (0, 3, 5), and l  (0, 6, 8). With this setup, we can
show that the supply chain optimal set is {i , j, k}, and
it leads to the optimal supply chain profit of 100. Now
consider a set of bids i  (0, 9.8), j  (0, 3.6), k  (0, 3.8),
and l  (0, 6), where the entries in each pair represent
the execution price and the reservation price, respec-
tively. Given these bids, the buyer’s optimal choice is
still {i , j, k}, and the profit split among players is as fol-
lows: supplier i makes a profit of 29, supplier j makes
a profit of 3, supplier k makes a profit of 4, supplier l
makes a profit of 0, and the buyer’s profit is 64. We can
write the corresponding allocation as a (29, 3, 4, 0, 64).
It can be checked that this allocation is in the core
of the corresponding cooperative game as previously
defined. However, we can show that supplier j will
have an incentive to deviate from the bid (0, 3.6, 5). This
implies that a set of bids that lead to an allocation in
the core may not form an equilibrium. 
The discussion above shows the limit of the connec-
tions between the noncooperative game and coopera-
tive game for our model setup. The solution concept
of a Nash equilibrium involves a single player (a sup-
plier) being unable to claim a greater allocationwithout
the buyer’s choice (which also equates to the winning
coalition) being changed. But in this equilibrium con-
cept an increase in the supplier’s profit will automati-
cally lead to a reduction in the buyer’s profit (the buyer
being a Stackelberg follower), and this is the key differ-
ence between ourmodel and the cooperative game.
6. Extensions
The model so far has assumed that suppliers do not
have access to the spot market, the buyer is restricted
to reserving a whole block at a time, and each sup-
plier has a single block. In this section, we examine the
impact of each of these assumptions.
Extension 1: Supplier Participation
in the Spot Market
In our baseline model, we consider the case where sup-
pliers dedicate blocks of capacity that are bid into the
option market with unused capacity being wasted. In
some cases, however, if the buyer does not use all of
the reserved capacity, suppliers may sell the unused
capacity to the spot market, which therefore provides
suppliers with a second source of revenue. We inves-
tigate whether the consideration of suppliers’ partici-
pation in the spot market will change the main results
derived for the baseline model.
As before, given bids B  {(pi , ri ,Ki): i ∈ N}, sup-
pose the buyer’s reservation set is S  { j1 , . . . , jv}. For
any demand t and spot price p0, recall that the buyer’s
used amount from supplier ji is given by xi(t , p0). For
simplicity, we assume the spot market has perfect liq-
uidity so that suppliers have complete access to the
spot market. Thus, supplier ji will sell K ji − xi(t , p0) to
the spot market, and any supplier m < S will sell Km to
the spot market.
Note that the buyer’s problem remains the same as
in the baseline model, so all the results for the buyer’s
optimal choice will carry over to this extended case.
We now consider the suppliers’ problem and show
how the results of Theorems 2 and 3 carry over to this
setting.
Proposition 2. Suppose that suppliers may sell their un-
used capacities to the spot market; then (a) given bids
{(pi , ri ,Ki): i ∈ L} it is optimal for supplier ` to choose
p∗`  c`; (b) when all blocks are of an equal size, the bids
B∗  {(ci , r∗i ): i ∈ N} form a Nash equilibrium, where r∗i 
ei +Π∗C(N) −Π∗C(N\{i}) for i ∈ N . Moreover, at any equi-
librium bids with p∗i  ci , i ∈ N , the buyer chooses the
supply chain optimal set N(C)∗; supplier i ∈ N ∗C makes a
profit pi∗i  Π
∗
C(N) −Π∗C(N\{i}) + ƐD ,P0[(P0 − ci)+ · (Ki −
min((D −Yw−1)+ ,Ki))], where w is the position of block i
within the set N ∗C and Yw−1 is the cumulative capacity of the
first w − 1 blocks of N ∗C; and supplier i < N ∗C makes a profit
pi∗i  ƐD ,P0[(P0 − ci − ei)+ ·Ki].
Part (a) of Proposition 2 shows that the result of The-
orem 2 still holds when suppliers can participate in
the spot market. One can see from the proof of the
proposition in the appendix that although supplier `’s
best response remains unchanged, his expected profit
is increased by the additional profit obtained by selling
the unused capacity to the spot market. Similarly, part
(b) of Proposition 2 extends Theorem 3 to the setting
where suppliers can participate in the spot market. The
equilibrium bidding strategies remain unchanged, but
each supplier’s equilibrium profit is increased by the
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additional profit obtained by selling the unused capac-
ity to the spot market.
The above results demonstrate the limited impact
of suppliers’ participation in the spot market on the
main results derived in the paper. Since competition
occurs in the option market only, suppliers’ participa-
tion in the spot market simply increases each supplier’s
profit and does not change the competitive dynamics in
the option market. Therefore, the equilibrium bidding
strategies remain unchanged.
Extension 2: Partial Reservation
In this extension, the buyer is not restricted to reserving
a whole block. As in the baseline model, each supplier
owns a single block and the blocks can be of different
sizes. Every supplier chooses an execution price and a
reservation price for all elements of his block.
One of the key results obtained for our baseline
model, Theorem 2, is that a best response for each sup-
plier i is to set p∗i  ci and the suppliers make profits
only through reservation payments. For this extension,
however, this result fails, as we demonstrate with the
following example.
Suppose the random demand is given by Pr[D  i]
1/5 for i  1, . . . , 5, the retail price is ρ  15, and spot
prices are 15. Supplier ` has a block of size K`  3
and both the execution and reservation costs are c` 
e`  2. The other bids {(pi , ri ,Ki): i  1, 2} are B0 
{(1, 3, 1), (4, 1, 1)}. We investigate the best response
of supplier ` in choosing (p` , r`). Denote B′  B0 ∪
{(2, 2, 3)}, in which supplier ` bids at cost.
The buyer’s optimal solution includes all the three
blocks with five units, which are used according to
increasing order of execution prices in uncertainty real-
ization. Therefore, recalling that the bids are in unit
prices, we obtain the buyer’s maximum expected profit
as follows:
Π∗B′(N)
( 5
5 (15− 1) − 3
)
+
( 4∑
k2
k
5 (15− 2) − 2× 3
)
+
( 1
5 (15− 4) − 1
)
 29.6.
Note that if supplier ` is unavailable, the buyer will
choose both blocks in B0, making a profit of
Π∗B0(N\{`}) 55 (15− 1) − 3+ 45 (15− 4) − 1 18.8.
Given that supplier ` bids at cost, we would expect
that the maximum profit supplier ` could achieve is
29.6 − 18.8  10.8 (and this is the case for the baseline
model). However, in the extended model, the optimal
profit of supplier ` is less than 10.8.
We show that it is suboptimal for supplier ` to
choose p∗`  2. First we observe that to make nonneg-
ative expected profit in this case, supplier ` has to set
his reservation price r` > 2. Since from supplier ` the
buyer can reserve 0, 1, 2, or 3 units to maximize her
expected profit, her objective is tomaximize the follow-
ing function:
f (r`)max{ f0(r`), f1(r`), f2(r`), f3(r`)}, r` > 2,
where fi(r`) (i  0, . . . , 3) are respective expected profits
when reserving i units from supplier ` in addition to
the two units from the other two suppliers, which can
be easily calculated as follows:
f0(r`) 18.8, f1(r`) 27− r` , f2(r`) 32.6− 2r` ,
f3(r`) 35.6− 3r` .
Therefore, we have
f (r`)

f3(r`), 2 6 r` 6 3;
f2(r`), 3 < r` 6 5.6;
f1(r`), 5.6 < r` 6 8.2;
f0(r`), r` > 8.2.
Accordingly, the expected profit pi`(r`) of supplier ` is
as follows:
pi`(r`)

3(r` − 2), 2 6 r` 6 3;
2(r` − 2), 3 < r` 6 5.6;
r` − 2, 5.6 < r` 6 8.2;
0, r` > 8.2.
Therefore, at r∗`  5.6, the expected profit pi`(r`) is max-
imized to pi∗`  7.2.
On the other hand, if the bids of supplier ` are set
at (p′` , r′`)  (15, 0), then the buyer will reserve all five
units from the three suppliers with expected profit of
18.8, which gives supplier ` an expected profit
pi′` 
( 3
5 +
2
5 +
1
5
)(p′` − c`)+ 3(r′` − e`) 9.6.
Consequently, we obtain pi∗` < pi
′
` .
In this extension, the buyer can determine the reser-
vation quantity, which depends on supplier bids (see a
similar result in Proposition 1 of Martínez-de-Albéniz
and Simchi-Levi 2009). The suppliers’ profits depend
on both the buyer’s quantity and the prices, and it
turns out that charging execution costs may be subopti-
mal for suppliers. In fact, this extended model reduces
to the model of Martínez-de-Albéniz and Simchi-Levi
when the spot market is absent and each supplier has
a very large capacity.
Extension 3: Multiple Blocks with Common Owner
In this section, each supplier ownsmultiple unit-blocks
and can choose different prices for different unit-
blocks. As before the buyer can freely choose among
the offered blocks. We will show that the key result
p∗i  ci does not hold in this extension either.
We will continue to use the example as given in
Extension 2. For this extension, we can think of a sin-
gle supplier ` owning three unit-blocks with costs
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that are identical across these unit-blocks. In contrast
with the partial reservation case, supplier ` can choose
different prices for the three unit-blocks. We denote
by {(p`1 , r`1), (p`2 , r`2), (p`3 , r`3)} the bidding strategy of
supplier `.
On one hand, if we impose the constraints of p∗`1 
p∗`2  p
∗
`3  2, by assuming without loss of generality
that r∗`1 6 r
∗
`2 6 r
∗
`3, we find that as in the case of Exten-
sion 2, it is optimal for supplier ` to set r∗`1  r
∗
`2 
r∗`3  5.6, and the buyer will reserve two unit-blocks of
supplier ` in addition to the two blocks of the other two
suppliers. Thus supplier `’s expected profit is pi∗`  7.2
as in Extension 2.
On the other hand, as we have shown in the example
for Extension 2, if supplier ` sets (p` j , r` j) (15, 0) for all
j  1, 2, 3, then he will have an expected profit of pi` 
9.6. Actually, he can even do better by setting p′`1  2,
r′`1  8.2, p
′
`2  p
′
`3  15, and r
′
`2  r
′
`3  0. The buyer will
then still reserve all five blocks of the three suppliers,
which gives supplier ` an expected profit
pi′` 
4
5 (p′`1 − c`)+ r′`1 − e` + 25 (p′`2 − c`)+ r′`2 − e`
+
1
5 (p′`3 − c`)+ r′`3 − e`
 8.2− 2+ 2+ 15 (15− 2)+ 2(0− 2) 10.
Since pi∗` < pi
′
` , it is suboptimal to force p
∗
`1  p
∗
`2  p
∗
`3  2.
The reason why the result p∗i  ci does not hold in
this extension is because, in addition to the external
competition between suppliers, there is also internal
competition between blocks within each supplier. As
shown inMartínez-de-Albéniz and Simchi-Levi (2009),
firms compete with others with similar technologies,
leading to the cluster competition in groups of two
or three at equilibrium. In a similar vein, suppliers in
this extended model tend to diversify their blocks to
mitigate the internal competition between their own
blocks. Consequently, setting p∗i  ci may not be optimal
for supplier i.
7. Conclusions
We have considered a situation in which suppliers
compete by offering option contracts to a buyer who
faces demand uncertainty and spot price volatility.
In this model each supplier has a block of capacity
and sets two prices: a reservation price and an exe-
cution price. The buyer needs to choose which blocks
of capacity to reserve in advance of knowing the cus-
tomer demand and spot price. Thus the buyer’s prob-
lem becomes combinatorial: choosing the right subset
of suppliers to select, which is the key difference from
the existing literature.
We have analyzed the buyer’s problem and shown
how it can be efficiently solved. The buyer’s capac-
ity reservation problem is interesting in its own right,
though our primary interest is in the suppliers’ deci-
sions given that the buyer behaves optimally. In the
case where suppliers have equal-size blocks, we are
able to develop an efficient algorithm to solve for the
optimal buyer choice in polynomial time. Regarding
the suppliers’ bidding behavior, we find that if the com-
peting suppliers know the other bids that the buyer
may choose from, then it is optimal for each supplier
to bid their real execution costs and make profit only
from the reservation margin. However, the result does
not hold when the buyer is able to reserve just a por-
tion of a block or if a single supplier owns more than
one block that can be offered at different prices.
Our model combines features from two models in
the literature. It has limited capacity and a spot mar-
ket as occur in Wu and Kleindorfer (2005), at the same
time it includes the uncertain demand that character-
izes the model of Martínez-de-Albéniz and Simchi-
Levi (2009). In addition we have a block structure, and
it is this characteristic that enables us to recover Wu
and Kleindorfer’s result that execution prices are set at
costs. We have also shown that the equilibrium results
remain intact when the spot market is present. Without
the spot market, similar to Martínez-de-Albéniz and
Simchi-Levi (2005, 2009), it is demand uncertainty and
supplier heterogeneity (in terms of cost structure) that
lead to a portfolio effect of the buyer’s choice. We show
that when the buyer is restricted to reserving complete
blocks only, the system efficiency can be achieved, a
result in contrast with that of Martínez-de-Albéniz and
Simchi-Levi (2009).
By using a submodularity result on the buyer’s opti-
mal profit as a function of the available set of supplier
bids, we are able to analyze the equilibrium behav-
ior for the suppliers. When the blocks are of equal
size, the equilibrium is essentially unique: the buyer
choice at equilibrium matches that which achieves the
maximum overall profit in the supply chain, and each
supplier makes a profit equal to its contribution (i.e.,
the difference between the overall supply chain profit
when that supplier is present and when he is absent).
But this equilibrium result depends on the fact that
each supplier having the same capacity. In the case
that suppliers have blocks of different sizes, the equi-
librium is no longer unique, and we characterize a set
of equilibria that imply different profit values for the
suppliers, depending onwhich equilibrium occurs. For
this set of equilibria, again, the supply chain achieves
its maximum overall profit.
Our model starts with the assumption that suppli-
ers do not participate in the spot market, which fits
some settings better than others. This assumption is
suitable when it is difficult for suppliers to sell their
excess capacity to the spot market at the last minute. In
the UK’s STOR market, for example, service providers
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must be able to deliver full MW within 240 min-
utes or less from receiving instructions from National
Grid (National Grid 2017). In other settings, however,
production or delivery lead times may be short, and
suppliers may be able to sell the unused capacity to
the spot market. For this setting, we have relaxed the
assumption of nonparticipation of suppliers in the spot
market and shown that the main results remain quali-
tatively unchanged.
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